ESSEX POLICE, FIRE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER FIRE & RESCUE AUTHORITY





Meeting	Performance and Resource	es Board	Agenda r	10.	10
Meeting Date	Aug 2023				
Report Authors:	AM Neil Fenwick, Amanda Johnson				
Presented By	Andy Smith, Director of Operations				
Subject	Grenfell Phase 1 and Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 - Update				
Type of Report:	Information				
Action Point No.	N/A	For Publica	tion	Yes	

RECOMMENDATIONS

To note progress on the actions of the Phase 1 Grenfell Action Plan and the Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 recommendations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report covers an update on progress against the Grenfell Recommendations and the MAI2 Recommendations relevant to ECFRS.

SRO is the Director of Operations, Sponsor is AM Neil Fenwick, the Project Manager is the Senior Projects Manager for Collaboration, Amanda Johnson.

The Project Board is chaired by the Director of Operations. The recommendations for both inquiries are managed via MS Planners with every recommendation 'owned' by an Assistant Director/Area Manager.

Grenfell Status

Grenfell sits within the Portfolio of Change, with highlight reports completed for the Portfolio Management Board. All 46 recommendations, bar three, have been closed and assured. The remaining three were dependant on the implementation of the new Control system, Guardian and will be Closed at the next Project Board in September.

This aspect of the Project will be moving to Business As Usual on 1st October 2023. All of the recommendations will be listed under the Strategic Risk SRR150034 as control measures with a BAU Plan which will detail how the Service will remain compliant. Additionally, the Project has been subject of an external audit from RSM and recommendations from the agreed report will be incorporated into the BAU plans.

MAI2 Status

Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 (MAI2) sits with the Emergency Services Collaboration Portfolio for oversight of all 149 recommendations. The Grenfell Project Board has been expanded to include updates and progress against the Fire specific recommendations from the Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 report published in November 2022.

The NFCC have also confirmed that there are 48 recommendations that all FRS need to consider their compliance against. A return is required to the NFCC by 29th August on status and progress against these 48.

- 14 of these are Fire related: National FRS, GMFRS and NW Fire Control and ECFRS have already completed the gap analysis against.
 - 11 have no gap identified and the Statements of Compliance and Closure will be completed by 31st August, and the Level 3 Assurance by next Board in mid September.
 - The three with an identified gap have an allocated AM and a Target date for completion and a Definition of Done for full assurance.
- The remaining 34 are directed at other Agencies and are undergoing a full gap analysis, to determine the current compliance status with ECFRS and what the ask of the FRS is against them as some do not mention the FRS. Three have an identified gap and potential risk which will require full assurance.

In addition to the 48, there are 29 recommendations directed to JESIP and requiring a multi-agency approach to compliance. 16 are included in the NFCC listed ones and Fire will lead on these from a JESIP view (to avoid duplication), the others are led by either Police or EEAST and will require input and engagement with ECFRS to meet compliance.

BACKGROUND

Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, released its report, including 46 recommendations based on 14 areas of interest identified by the inquiry. These are managed within ECFRS through a robust governance and assurance process using MS Planner.

Following the publication of the Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 in Nov 2022 the team have applied the same governance and assurance process to the management of the 149 recommendations. This report covers an update on those that are directed at the FRS or 'for consideration' (as directed by the NFCC) by the Fire Service. Appendix A details the overarching governance process for all 149 MAI2 recommendations overseen by the Emergency Services Collaboration team to oversee governance and assurance across all of the agencies for the recommendations using the lessons learned from Grenfell.

OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS

Grenfell Tower Inquiry Recommendations

46 Recommendations

Progress made to date is as follows:

- All recommendations are now Closed and Assured bar three, which will be Closed Assured by the September Project Board. All have auditable evidence and solutions/activity, which is suitable, sufficient and sustainable to meet the requirements of the recommendations. Dashboard Update on Actions within the Grenfell Plan.
 - Open, Not Progressing 0
 the Action is open, but requires performance managing to progress, has other blockers or is awaiting national guidance/legislation.
 - Open, Progressing 0
 the Action is still open, and is progressing within scope, quality and stated timeframes.
 - Closed awaiting Assurance 3
 Levels 1 and 2 of the Assurance framework have been completed and is with Operational Assurance for Level 3 assurance.
 - Closed Assured 43

Operational Assurance have confirmed there is suitable and sufficient evidence, which is accessible, that the action is completed to the required standard within the Assurance Framework and meets the original requirements. Project Board have verified this and made decision to Close the Action.

Number of actions by Owner:

- AD/AM Response 10 [3 Closed Awaiting Assurance, 7 Closed Assured]
- AD/AM Prevention and Protection 16 [All Closed Assured]
- AD/AM Service Delivery 14 [All Closed Assured]
- AD/AM Ops Assurance-Risk 2 Closed Assured
- Assistant Chief Executive People Values and Culture 4 [All Closed Assured]

The Assurance Process has worked well with the Ops Assurance team returning Recommendations which do not meet the full criteria for assurance (suitable, sufficient, sustainable evidence that is accessible).

When the Grenfell aspect transitions to BAU on 1st October 2023, all 49 recommendations will become individual control measures under the Corporate Inquiry Compliance risk SRR150034 on JCAD, with the measures detailing the sustainable BAU plan for each one to maintain compliance.

2. NFCC Reporting for Grenfell.

37 NFCC Questions

The questions in the return are being managed in the same way as the actions, with each question cross-referred to an action for assurance and evidence purposes where possible. These are likely to be the areas of Inquiry for an HMICFRS interest.

The latest 'snapshot' was taken on 17th April 2023.

- Open Progressing 1 relates to the implementation of NOG which is out for consultation with the Rep Bodies. It has a due date of September 2023.
- Closed and Evidenced 35

3. Financials – Protection Uplift Fund.

Appendix A is the report up to July 2023.

The reporting of spend against the Protection Uplift Fund is reported to SLT via the Protection team and by this Board to P&R. In order to avoid duplication, the AD/AM Prevention and Protection report to SLT, and this Board will have oversight of what has been spent in regard to Grenfell recommendations.

Once Grenfell transitions to BAU the reporting line to SLT will continue, a decision has yet to be made on wider reporting to P&R or P&E Boards.

4. HMICFRS Inspection and Exercise

The service is undertaking a number of exercises prior to the one for the HMICFRS in September around a High Rise Exercise to test a number of elements of its learning, new technology and Grenfell recommendations in a practical setting and then replicate in a tabletop exercise. This will be used as an opportunity to stress test our Electronic Evacuation Boards, Smoke hoods / curtains and Fire survival Guidance as well as an opportunity for our control room to be able to use its guidance and communication links to the scene of operations.

Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 2 Recommendations

149 Recommendations across multiple agencies. These are currently being managed as follows(detailed in Appendix B)

- 1. All recommendations have a designated 'lead' agency, agreed in conjunction with relevant sponsors from ECFRS, Essex Police (EP), East of England Ambulance Trust (EEAST), JESIP and the Essex LRF(ERF).
- 2. Recommendations led by ECFRS, EP, JESIP or the ERF are being managed as a Programme within the Emergency Services Collaboration Portfolio and each have their own Project Board and Strategic Board, with each set of recommendations managed through an MS Planner with ownership and assurance processes. Those not within that programme which are being led by a different agency e.g. BTP and EEAST are reporting by exception to the JESIP Project Board [ESCP Senior Projects Manager is Deputy Chair], and then into the ERF Executive Board.
- We have also implemented an 'Oversight' Board with the Sponsors (ECFRS, EP/JESIP, ERF, EEAST) and ESCP SRO to review, manage and deconflict national and regional reporting requirements ensuring that there is a consistent message from Essex.

For those recommendation directed to the FRS:

- 1. Following the publication of the Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2, the team expanded the scope of this project to include Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 recommendations relating to Fire and manage the Fire related recommendations using the same robust process as we have in place for Grenfell.
- 2. FRS related recommendations are as follows:
 - National FRS two recommendations, only one of which is specific to each Service, the other is for the Fire Service College/NFCC
 - GMFRS has 4 recommendations
 - NW Fire Control have 8 recommendations
 - Currently the NFCC have also listed a further 34 recommendations which are multi-agency but have asked FRS to produce evidence around progress in their NFCC tracker.
 - All other recommendations will be tracked through other agency Boards with oversight being held by the Emergency Services Collaboration Programme.
 - 4. Based on the above governance and assurance structure, the current status for the ones directed to Fire is as follows:

Current status (14/08/2023) – all will have their Level 2 Assurance completed by 31st August (Statements of Compliance and Closure), and the Level 3 Assurance (Statement of Assurance) completed by September 21st 2023

National FRS	NW Fire Control	GMFRS	
130	28	36	
131	29	37	
	30	38	
	31	39	
	32		
	33		
	34		
	35		
Gap Identified	3	Open Progressing	3
		Complete Requires	
No Gap Identified	11	Assurance	(
		Complete Assured	
		requires Board	
		verification	
		Complete Assured	(
		L3 Assured further	
		evidence required	3

For the additional 34 within the NFCC tracker, the Gap Analysis is complete.
 This has determined the governance route based on whether there is an identified gap/risk or not. Where there is no gap the Statements of

Compliance (with evidence) and Closure will be written before 31st October 2023. Where there is a gap identified the AM owner will be allocated and they will complete the Definition of Done, evidential checklist and Target Date by 31st August.

- Gap Analysis Completed
 - o No Gap 31
 - o Gap 3
- In addition, there are several 'Monitored' recommendations which will be required to report back specifically to the Inquiry. Regarding those relating to Fire, only recommendations owned by GMFRS and NW Fire Control are monitored, so it is unlikely ECFRS will be asked to report specifically back to the Inquiry.

Assurance Process - Appendix C

- Gaps Identified: Added to Open Progressing if any gaps identified and it is felt there is a risk or service improvement to be made. These will go through full governance and assurance, requiring a Definition of Done and owned by an AM.
- No gap identified and ECFRS is compliant then a Statement of Compliance explaining how ECFRS have this embedded, with auditable and verifiable evidence.
- Prior to L3 Assurance all recommendations will also need a Statement of Closure which details the BAU plan for on-going and sustainable compliance to be maintained.

RISKS AND MITIGATIONS

JCAD Risk SRR150034: There is a risk that the Service does not implement, within required timescales and sustainably, recommendations from external Inquiries into similar organisations; resulting in a failure to prevent a repeat of the mistakes highlighted and to restore public confidence.

Trigger: A failure to adequately, govern and assure the action plan put in place to deliver against the recommendations from the relevant Inquiry.

Impact: Mistakes could be repeated, with subsequent loss of life, and the 'public concern' about the event/events leading to the Inquiry are not addressed.

Mitigation: Project Board set up to deliver compliance to Inquiry recommendations and ensure compliance is sustainable and maintained. Once in BAU recommendations will become control measures within the JCAD Strategic Risk.

Mitigations:

- Grenfell Inquiry Phase 1 Once transitioned to BAU (1st October 2023), all Grenfell recommendations will become control measures under the corporate risk in JCAD, with the BAU plan of how the Service will maintain compliance
- Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 2 published in November 2022. Governance and Assurance process implemented, using the learning from the Grenfell Inquiry. Recommendations allocated to the main agency to which they are directed

at, with oversight for Essex maintained by the Emergency Services Collaboration Team.

LINKS TO FIRE AND RESCUE PLAN

Links to the Fire and Rescue Plan:

- Make best use of our resources
- Annual Plan AP202122- 08

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Appendix B is the Financial Report for the Protection Uplift Grant.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

Changes to Fire Safety legislation are anticipated following Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 which is likely to drive changes inspection regimes and statutory responsibilities in high rise residential buildings. This has driven changes to ECFRS Protection Strategy which has been reviewed to take this into account. The strategy and the accompanying Risk Based Inspection Programme have been approved.

STAFFING IMPLICATIONS

Proposed project resources and project management team structure are stated in the PID [para. 2.3 and 4]

EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS

We have considered whether individuals with protected characteristics will be disadvantaged as a consequence of the actions being taken. Due regard has also been given to whether there is impact on each of the following protected groups as defined within the Equality Act 2010:

Race	N	Religion or belief	N
Sex	N	Gender reassignment	Ν
Age	N	Pregnancy & maternity	Ν
Disability	N	Marriage and Civil Partnership	Ν
Sexual orientation	N	-	

The Core Code of Ethics Fire Standard has been fully considered and incorporated into the proposals outlined in this paper.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Under the Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974 we have a duty to protect the Health, Safety and Welfare at work of all employees as well as others who may be affected by our work including the general public. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 also identifies our obligation to continually assess risks. The proposed piece of work seeks to identify any gaps in the approach to the management of operational risk in relation to high rise residential fire procedures and ultimately to contribute to the Health and Safety of responders and residents of High Rise residential buildings.

CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT

The Project has a Communications Strategy where appropriate consultation and engagement is considered.

Engagement with Rep Bodies will be undertaken by the project Sponsor through the standard JNCC process.

FUTURE PLANS

We will look to maintain compliance with all recommendations following closure of the Grenfell Inquiry project using Risk SRR150034.

LIST OF BACKGROUND PAPERS AND APPENDICES

Appendix A – Protection Update finance report

Appendix B – Governance process for MAI2 recommendations

Appendix C – Assurance process