



Classification	Official		
Meeting	Performance and Resources Board	Agenda no.	11
Meeting Date	23 February 2023		
Report Authors:	AM Neil Fenwick, Amanda Johnson		
Presented By	Chris Parker, Director of Operations		
Subject	Quarterly Update Grenfell Phase 1 High Level Action Plan		
Type of Report:	Information		
Action Point No.	N/A	For Publication	Yes

RECOMMENDATIONS

To note progress on the actions of the Phase 1 Grenfell Action Plan recommendations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report covers an update on progress against the Grenfell Recommendations and the Manchester Recommendations relevant to ECFRS.

Sponsor is the Assistant Director for Change and Operations Policy, SRO is AM Neil Fenwick, the Project Manager is the Senior Projects Manager for Collaboration, Amanda Johnson. The Project Board has been expanded to include updates and progress against the Fire specific recommendations from the Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 report published in November 2022.

The Project Board is chaired by the Director of Operations. The actions are managed via MS Planner with every action 'owned' by an Assistant Director/Area Manager.

BACKGROUND

Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, released its report, including 46 recommendations based on 14 areas of interest identified by the inquiry. These are managed within ECFRS through a robust governance and assurance process using MS Planner.

Following the publication of the Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2 in Nov 2022 the team have applied the same governance and assurance process to the management of the 149 recommendations. This report covers an update on those that are directly or indirectly related to the Fire Service. Appendix A details the overarching governance process for all 149 recommendations overseen by the Emergency Services Collaboration team to oversee governance and assurance across all of the agencies for the recommendations using the lessons learned from Grenfell.

OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS

Grenfell Tower Inquiry Recommendations (46 Recommendations)

Progress made to date is as follows:

1. Steady progress is being made to completing and closing the recommendations, and providing auditable evidence and solutions/activity, which is suitable, sufficient and sustainable to meet the requirements of the recommendations. Dashboard Update on Actions within the Grenfell Plan.
 - **Open, Not Progressing – 0**
the Action is open, but requires performance managing to progress, has other blockers or is awaiting national guidance/legislation.
 - **Open, Progressing – 19**
the Action is still open, and is progressing within scope, quality and stated timeframes.
 - **Closed awaiting Assurance – 12**
Levels 1 and 2 of the Assurance framework have been completed and is with Operational Assurance for Level 3 assurance.
 - **Closed Assured – 15**
Operational Assurance have confirmed there is suitable and sufficient evidence, which is accessible, that the action is completed to the required standard within the Assurance Framework and meets the original requirements. Project Board have verified this and made decision to Close the Action.

Number of actions by Owner:

- **AD/AM Response – 9** [All Open progressing]
- **AD/AM Prevention and Protection - 16** [13 Awaiting Assurance, 3 Closed Assured]
- **AD/AM Service Delivery - 9** [5 Open Progressing, 1 Awaiting Assurance, 10 Closed Assured]
- **AD/AM Ops Assurance-Risk – 2** Closed Assured
- **Assistant Chief Executive • People Values and Culture – 3** [All Open Progressing]

The Assurance Process is working well with the Ops Assurance team returning Recommendations which do not meet the full criteria for assurance (suitable, sufficient, sustainable evidence that is accessible).

Appendix B is a snap-shot of the GTI recommendations narrative at 3 February 2023.

2. NFCC Reporting for Grenfell (37 NFCC Questions)

The questions in the return are being managed in the same way as the actions, with each question cross-referred to an action for assurance and evidence purposes where possible. These are likely to be the areas of Inquiry for an HMICFRS interest.

- Open Progressing 14
- Closed and Evidenced 23

3. Financials – Protection Uplift Fund. (Appendix C)

Key points this quarter:

- The Service has received confirmation that it will receive the next instalment of £128k in March,
- Thanks to the efforts of the Protection and Finance teams the NFCC are now happy with the forecast we are showing.

The reporting of spend against the Protection Uplift Fund is reported to SLT via the Protection team and by this Board to P&R. In order to avoid duplication, the AD/AM Prevention and Protection report to SLT, and this Board will have oversight of what has been spent in regard to Grenfell recommendations.

Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 2 Recommendations (146 Recommendations across multiple agencies, Appendix D)

1. Following the publication of the Manchester Arena Inquiry Vol 2, the team has expanded the scope of this project to include Manchester Arena recommendations relating to Fire and manage the Fire related recommendations using the same robust process as we have in place for Grenfell.
2. Fire related recommendations are as follows:
 - National Fire – two recommendations, only one of which is specific to each Service, the other is for the Fire Service College/NFCC
 - GMFRS has 4 recommendations
 - NW Fire Control have 8 recommendations
 - All other recommendations will be tracked through other Boards with oversight being held by the Emergency Services Collaboration Programme. Please see Appendix A
3. These status of these recommendations are as follows:
 - National Fire – two recommendations R130 and R131. These will be managed and taken through the full assurance process.
 - GMFRS. A gap analysis and impact assessment has been undertaken. We have identified there are no gaps or risks associated with these recommendations. Evidence will be provided to prove how and why ECFRS are compliant and moved into the Risk Assured, No Further Action bucket once this is provided.
 - NW Fire Control. A gap analysis and impact assessment has been undertaken.
 - Five have no gap identified. Evidence will be provided to prove how and why ECFRS are compliant and moved into the Risk Assured, No Further Action bucket once this is provided.

- Three have a gap and potential risk identified. These will follow the full assurance process, requiring a Definition of Done, Checklist of activity to be completed and evidence log in place. These three are:
 - Recommendations 28, 29 and 30
- In addition, there are several 'Monitored' recommendations which will be required to report back specifically to the Inquiry. Regarding those relating to Fire, only recommendations owned by GMFRS and NW Fire Control are monitored, so it is unlikely ECFRS will be asked to report specifically back to the Inquiry.
- Whilst the services is waiting for further guidance from the NFCC, it believes the activity in place puts it in a robust position once further guidance is in place.
- The service is looking to see whether it should set up a regional lead/forum in the same way as we have done for Grenfell to share good practice and assurance processes.
- The team have attended two presentations regarding Manchester to raise awareness of the Service's current position to MAI (2) report and the recommendations within this report:
 - Webinar on 9th January 2023 led by Scott Wilson: Policing and Counter Terrorism Subject Matter Expert to the Manchester Arena Inquiry
 - Kerslake Report and Manchester Inquiry Presentation. Presentations delivered by Alan Goodwin QPM, who led the specialist advisory panel for the Kerslake Report, Supt Ricard Melton [JESIP] and Amanda Johnson [Governance/Assurance of MAI2] given to ECFRS SLT, ELT and senior commanders from Essex Police.
- Key points from these for Fire, which the assurance process will ensure are covered when delivering the recommendations are below:
 - How we ensure we remove personalities/relationships from what we do in relation to Op Plato/JESIP – what we develop / implement is sustainable even when people change and is robust enough to avoid it being overtaken by relationships/personalities
 - Ensuring that we turn any recommendations from exercises into lessons learnt / policy / procedures
 - Ensure we use the correct channels for deployments i.e not WhatsApp
 - Ensuring the right level of officer goes to the right location. For example, the CFO doesn't get involved at an operational/tactical level and locates appropriately.
 - Not self-deploying to the scene of operations when off duty.
 - Not being risk adverse, sending NILO to the scene to gain situational awareness, who then shares this information in the correct manner.
 - Ensuring we utilise our specialist equipment/teams in the first instance e.g. MTA assets from Rochford, Wethersfield and Newport.
 - Ensuring messages are shared appropriately through Control rooms.
 - Utilising airwave communications across partners eg ES1 etc.
 - Utilising information from social media – having a SPOC to carry out this role.

RISKS AND MITIGATIONS

JCAD Risk:

“Failure to progress the implementation of the recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s Phase 1 report”

Mitigation: Post Grenfell Action Plan and Project

Sponsor/SRO and Project Manager are considering whether the risk should be made a generic risk to cover ECFRS for any requirements coming out of Inquiries which ECFRS are then obligated to implement.

LINKS TO FIRE AND RESCUE PLAN

Links to the Fire and Rescue Plan:

- Make best use of our resources
- Annual Plan AP202122- 08

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

See Appendix C

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

Changes to Fire Safety legislation are anticipated following Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 which is likely to drive changes inspection regimes and statutory responsibilities in high rise residential buildings. This has driven changes to ECFRS Protection Strategy which has been reviewed to take this into account. The strategy and the accompanying Risk Based Inspection Programme have been approved.

STAFFING IMPLICATIONS

Proposed project resources and project management team structure are stated in the PID [para. 2.3 and 4]

EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS

We have considered whether individuals with protected characteristics will be disadvantaged as a consequence of the actions being taken. Due regard has also been given to whether there is impact on each of the following protected groups as defined within the Equality Act 2010:

Race	N	Religion or belief	N
Sex	N	Gender reassignment	N
Age	N	Pregnancy & maternity	N
Disability	N	Marriage and Civil Partnership	N
Sexual orientation	N		

The Core Code of Ethics Fire Standard has been fully considered and incorporated into the proposals outlined in this paper.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Under the Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974 we have a duty to protect the Health, Safety and Welfare at work of all employees as well as others who may be affected by our work including the general public. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 also identifies our obligation to continually assess risks. The proposed piece of work seeks to identify any gaps in the approach to the management of operational risk in relation to high rise residential fire procedures and ultimately to contribute to the Health and Safety of responders and residents of High Rise residential buildings.

CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT

The Project has a Communications Strategy where appropriate consultation and engagement is considered.

Engagement with Rep Bodies will be undertaken by the project Sponsor through the standard JNCC process.

FUTURE PLANS

We will look to implement all recommendations following all Grenfell Inquiry phases

LIST OF BACKGROUND PAPERS AND APPENDICES

Appendix A – Governance process for MAI2 recommendations

Appendix B – Grenfell Tower Inquiry Recommendations status

Appendix C – Protection Update finance report

Appendix D – Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations status