**Performance and Resources Scrutiny Programme 2018/2019**

**Report to: the Office of the Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner for Essex**

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| **Title of Report:** | **Treasury Management Outturn 2018/19** |
| **Agenda Number:** | **12.iii** |
| **Chief Officer** | **Abbey Gough, Acting Treasurer** |
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| **Report from:** | **Essex Police: Corporate Finance** |
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| **Author on behalf of Chief Officer:** | **Matthew Tokley, Corporate Accounting Manager** |
| **Date of Approval:** | **17/05/2019** |

1. **Purpose of Report**
   1. To present treasury management activities performed during 2018/19.
2. **Recommendations**
   1. The PFCC is recommended to note the activities and performance for 2018/19.
3. **Executive Summary**
   1. This report provides an overview for how the PFCC’s cash balances have been managed during 2018/19, and what investments and borrowings (where applicable) were undertaken during the year.

* 1. Section 3 of the main report sets out the treasury management performance in the year, whilst sections 4 and 5 refer to compliance in respect of the Treasury Management Strategy and statutory treasury management indicators. Supporting detail for the year-end investments position in shown in appendices A & B.

1. **Introduction/Background** 
   1. The background and statutory requirements for this paper are detailed within Section 1.0 of the main report.
2. **Current Work and Performance**
   1. The 2018/19 performance is set out in this report. In respect of 2019/20 the proposed approach and expected cash position is set out in the Treasury Management Strategy document, as previously approved by this board.
3. **Implications (Issues)**
   1. Financial implications are considered within the main body of this report.
4. **Links to Police and Crime Plan Priorities**
   1. The Force budget and cash resources are used to help meet the priorities of the Police and Crime plan.
5. **Demand**
   1. The Force budget is reviewed and re-allocated within virement rules to match demand e.g. overtime funded by vacancies. The OPFCC’s cash resources support the underlying demand for this process.
6. **Risks/Mitigation**
   1. Both the CIPFA Code and government guidance require the force to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its investments before seeking the highest rate of return, or yield. The OPFCC objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.

9.2 Risk Register URN 452 - Short and Long Term Capital Finance.

1. **Equality and/or Human Rights Implications**

10.1 N/A

1. **Health and Safety Implications**

11.1 N/A

1. **Consultation/Engagement**

12.1 The paper has been prepared in consultation with Arlingclose, the OPFCC’s treasury management advisers.

1. **Actions for Improvement**

13.1 These are fully considered within the main body of this report.

1. **Future Work/Development and Expected Outcome**
   1. The performance against the 2019/20 Treasury Management Strategy will be reviewed as the year progresses with a half year outturn report produced. The impact of any material issues, whether related to the internal or external context, will be considered for inclusion and/or amendment within the 2020/21 Treasury Management Strategy.
2. **Decisions Required by the Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner**

15.1 Please see recommendations section.

**Treasury Management Outturn 2018/19**

**1.0 Introduction**

1.1 During 2018/19 the OPFCC has adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy’s *Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice 2017 Edition* (the CIPFA Code) which requires the PFCC to approve a treasury management strategy before the start of each financial year as well as an annual treasury management outturn report. This report fulfils the OPFCC’s legal obligation under the Local Government Act 2003 to have regard to the CIPFA Code.

1.2 The OPFCC’s treasury management strategy for 2018/19 was formally approved on the 17th April 2018, having originally been presented at the Performance and Resources Board on the 2nd February 2018.

**2.0 External Context**

2.1 **Economic background:** Oil prices fell back sharply by the end of the year, declining to just over $50 in late December before steadily climbing toward $70 in April 2019. UK Consumer Price Inflation (CPI) for February 2019 was up 1.9% year on year, just above the consensus forecast but broadly in line with the Bank of England’s February Inflation Report. The labour market data for the three months to January 2019 showed that the unemployment rate fell to a new low of 3.9% while the employment rate of 76.1% was the highest on record. The three month average annual growth rate for pay excluding bonuses was 3.4% as wages continued to rise steadily and provide some upward pressure on general inflation. Once adjusted for inflation, the real wages increase was 1.4%.

2.2 After rising to 0.6% in the third 2019 calendar quarter (from 0.4% in the second quarter), the fourth quarter economic growth slowed to 0.2% as weaker expansion in production, construction and services dragged on overall activity. Annual GDP growth at 1.4% continues to remain below trend. Following the Bank of England’s decision to increase the bank rate to 0.75% in August 2018, no changes to monetary policy have been made since.

2.3 The US Federal Reserve continued its tightening bias throughout 2018, pushing rates to the 2.25%-2.50% range in December. However, a recent softening in US data caused the Federal Reserve to signal a pause in hiking interest rates at the last Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting in March.

2.4 With the 29th March 2019, the original EU ‘exit day’ now passed, MPs voted by a majority of one (313 to 312) to force the Prime Minister to ask for an extension to the Brexit process beyond the 12th April 2019 in order to avoid a no-deal scenario. Recent talks between the Conservative and Labour parties to try to reach common ground on a deal which may pass a vote by MPs have yet to yield any positive results. The EU must approve any extension and its leaders have been clear that the terms of the deal are not up for further negotiation. The ongoing uncertainty continues to weigh on sterling and UK markets.

2.5 While the domestic focus has been on Brexit’s potential impact on the UK economy, globally the first quarter of 2019 has been overshadowed by a gathering level of broader based economic uncertainty. The US continues to be set on a path of protectionist trade policies and tensions with China in particular, but with the potential for this to spill over into wider trade relationships, most notably with the EU. The EU has itself appeared to show signs of a rapid slowdown in economic growth with the major engines of its economy, Germany and France, both suffering misfires from downturns in manufacturing alongside continued domestic/populist unrest in France. The International Monetary Fund downgraded its forecasts for global economic growth in 2019 and beyond as a result.  
  
2.6 **Financial markets:** December 2018 showed a downturn in terms of performance of riskier asset classes, most notably equities. The FTSE 100 (a good indicator of global corporate sentiment) fell around 13% in pure price terms. However, since the beginning of 2019 markets have rallied, and the FTSE 100 and FTSE All Share indices were both around 10% higher than at the end of 2018.

2.7 Gilt yields continued to display significant volatility over the period on the back of ongoing economic and political uncertainty in the UK and Europe. After rising in October 2018, gilts regained their safe-haven status throughout December and into 2019. The 5-year benchmark gilt yield fell as low as 0.80% and there were similar falls in the 10-year and 20-year gilts over the same period dropping from 1.73% to 1.08% and from 1.90% to 1.55%. The increase in bank rate pushed up money markets rates over the year and 1-month, 3-month and 12-month LIBID (London Interbank Bid) rates averaged 0.53%, 0.67% and 0.94% respectively over the period.

2.8 Recent activity in the bond markets and PWLB interest rates highlight that weaker economic growth is not just a UK phenomenon but a global risk. During March 2019 the US yield curve inverted and German 10-year Bund yields turned negative. The drivers were a significant shift in global economic growth prospects and subsequent official interest rate expectations given its impact on inflation expectations. Further to this, world trade growth collapsed at the end of 2018 falling by 1.8% year-on-year. A large proportion of this downturn in trade can be ascribed to the ongoing trade tensions between the US and China which despite some moderation in January does suggest that the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation & Development’s (OECD) forecasts for global growth in 2019 of 3.5%, might need to be revised downwards.

2.9 **Credit background:** Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads drifted up towards the end of 2018 on the back of Brexit uncertainty before declining again in 2019 and continuing to remain low in historical terms. After hitting around 129 basis points in December 2018, the spread on non-ringfenced bank NatWest Markets plc fell back to around 96 basis points at the end of March, while for the ringfenced entity, National Westminster Bank plc, the CDS spread held relatively steady around 40 basis points. The other main UK banks, as yet not separated into ringfenced and non-ringfenced from a CDS perspective, traded between 33 and 79 basis points at the end of the period.

2.10 The ring-fencing of the big four UK banks (Barclays, Bank of Scotland/Lloyds, HSBC and RBS/Natwest Bank plc) transferred their business lines into retail (ringfenced) and investment banking (non-ringfenced) entities.

2.11 In February, Fitch put the UK AA sovereign long-term rating on Rating Watch Negative as a result of Brexit uncertainty, following this move with the same treatment for UK banks and a number of government-related entities.

2.12 There were minimal other credit rating changes during the period. Moody’s revised the outlook on Santander UK to positive from stable to reflect the bank’s expected issuance plans which will provide additional protection for the its senior unsecured debt and deposits.

**3.0 Local Context**

3.1 On the 31st March 2019 the PFCC had net investments of £18.540m arising from its revenue and capital income and expenditure, an increase of £4.410m compared to the corresponding position as at 31st March 2018. The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), while usable reserves and working capital are the underlying resources available for investment. These factors and the year-on-year change are summarised in table 1 below.

Table 1: Balance Sheet Summary

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **31.3.18**  **Actual**  **£m** | **2018/19**  **Movement**  **£m** | **31.3.19**  **Actual**  **£m** |
| CFR | 8.755 | (2.189) | 6.566 |
| Less: Usable reserves | (21.893) | (0.916) | (22.809) |
| Less: Working capital | (0.991) | (1.305) | (2.296) |
| **Net Investments** | **14.130** | **4.410** | **18.540** |

3.2 Net investments increased principally due to a corresponding decrease in short-term debtors which reduced by £3.497m (e.g. additional cash coming into the OPFCC bank accounts over the previous twelve months). Assets held for sale also decreased by £2.384m as these debtors crystallised into capital receipts during the year. The net impact of this additional cash, offset by some increased spending in front-line areas, equated to the net increase in investments of £4.410m.

3.3 The PFCC’s strategy was to maintain borrowing and investments below their underlying levels, sometimes known as internal borrowing, in order to reduce risk and keep interest costs low. There were no external borrowings outstanding at either the 31st March 2018 or the 31st March 2019 balance sheet dates. The treasury management position as at 31st March 2019 and the year-on-year change is shown in table 2 below. This is consistent with the position reported in the 2018/19 year-end Statement of Accounts.

Table 2: Treasury Management Strategy

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **31.3.18**  **Balance**  **£m** | **2018/19**  **Movement**  **£m** | **31.3.19**  **Balance**  **£m** |
| Long-term investments | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Short-term investments | 8.000 | 0.500 | 8.500 |
| Cash & Cash Equivalents | 6.130 | 3.910 | 10.040 |
| **Net Investments** | **14.130** | **4.410** | **18.540** |

3.4 The reduction in working capital referred to in paragraph 3.2 had a direct impact on the cash available to invest in the year. This is reflected in the increase in short-term investments held on the balance sheet as at 31st March 2019.

3.5 The OPFCC holds invested funds, representing income received in advance of expenditure plus balances and reserves held. During 2018/19 the PFCC’s investment balance ranged between £0m and £57m, due to timing differences between income and expenditure (principally the receipt of the Police Officer Pension Top-Up Grant from the Home Office in July 2018, which equated to £46.688m). The year-end investment position and the year-on-year change is shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Investment Position

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **31.3.18**  **Balance**  **£m** | **2018/19**  **Movement**  **£m** | **31.3.19**  **Balance**  **£m** |
| Call accounts | 2.000 | (0.880) | 1.120 |
| Notice accounts | 0.000 | 1.500 | 1.500 |
| Money market funds | 0.000 | 8.000 | 8.000 |
| Fixed term deposits | 8.000 | 0.500 | 8.500 |
| Force bank accounts cashbook value | 3.880 | (4.653) | (0.773) |
| Petty cash advances | 0.250 | (0.057) | 0.193 |
| **Net Investments\*** | **14.130** | **4.410** | **18.540** |

\*Full details of the investments as at the 31st March 2019 are shown in appendix A. Additionally, an alternative breakdown of the total investments during 2018/19 showing additional information is presented in appendix B.

3.6 Both the CIPFA Code and government guidance require the OPFCC to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its investments before seeking the highest rate of return, or yield. The PFCC’s objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.

3.7 The average level of investments over the twelve month period was £28.282m (£27.686m 2017/18). Interest earnings for the period were £0.167m (£0.064m 2017/18), representing an average return of 0.59% (0.23% 2017/18). The increase in the average rate of return was down to two main factors, firstly a wider range of investment vehicles used by the OPFCC during 2018/19, including three new money market fund accounts, as well as the increase in base rate to 0.75% in August 2018, which pushed up interest rates on the OPFCC’s investments.

3.8 2018/19 was the first year that money market funds (MMF’s) had been used by the OPFCC. Three accounts were set up with Aberdeen (previously Standard Life), Insight and Blackrock. MMF’s are pooled funds that invest in short-term debt instruments. They provide the benefit of pooled investment, as investors can participate in a more diverse and high-quality portfolio than they otherwise could individually. The principal benefits of MMF’s are preservation of capital, very high liquidity and competitive returns, and the OPFCC looked to utilise these to their full capacity from August 2018 onwards, when these new accounts were opened. Assuming funds were available the OPFCC held an optimum maximum balance of £10m in these funds during the remainder of the year, significantly reducing the number of fixed term deposits placed with the Debt Management Office during 2018/19 (82 deals as shown in Appendix B, compared to 147 deals placed during 2017/18). The use of MMF’s contributed significantly to the increased interest yield achieved during 2018/19.

3.9 The risk of funds being tied up in fixed-term deposits continued to be balanced by the use of ‘liquid’ accounts which provided same-day access to funds if and when the OPFCC’s cashflow position fell into deficit. Whilst yield continued to be a key element of the OPFCC’s treasury strategy the emphasis was increasingly focused on liquidity during 2018/19 and this will continue into 2019/20, particularly in respect of the current concerns with Brexit (see also paragraph 3.10). There is also an ongoing risk relating to the uncertain timing of a significant amount of high value capital receipts arising from the Estates rationalisation programme. The OPFCC will therefore continue to place a high importance on having access to monies in call accounts and money market funds to cover any delays in the timings of large value receipts.

3.10 **Readiness for Brexit:** With little by way of political clarity as to the exact date on whether there would be an agreed deal prior to leaving the EU and to be prepared for the outside chance of a particularly disruptive Brexit (such as last-minute no-deal) on the 29th March 2019, the OPFCC ensured there were enough accounts open at UK‑domiciled banks and Money Market Funds to hold sufficient liquidity over the year end and that its account with the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF) remained available for use in an emergency.

3.11 As at 31st March 2019, the OPFCC held £0.000m of external loans, a position consistent with the previous year.

3.12 Whilst no long-term external borrowing was required during the period there were four instances of short-term external borrowing during 2018/19. The detail of this borrowing is shown in table 4 on the following page.

Table 4: Short-Term Borrowings 2018/19

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **£m** | **Interest Rate** |
| Middlesbrough Council | 6.000 | 0.35% |
| Middlesbrough Council | 3.000 | 0.35% |
| Derbyshire Pension Fund | 4.000 | 0.45% |
| Bromsgrove Council | 2.500 | 0.45% |

3.13 The above borrowing was necessary to fund temporary deficits in the force cashflow, and all occurred in the first quarter of 2018/19 prior to the Police Officer Pension Top-Up grant being received from the Home Office.

3.14 The chief objective when undertaking short-term borrowing was to cover cashflow deficits, with the related interest rate paid dependent on the available market opportunities on the day concerned. The main factors considered were striking an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty over the period for which funds were required. Due to the short-term nature of the loans taken out during the year the financial impact was immaterial with total annual interest payable of £0.002m.

3.15 For the majority of the 2018/19 year, with short-term interest rates remaining much lower than long-term rates, the OPFCC considered it to be more cost effective to use internal resources to cover the daily cashflow position where a deficit occurred (such as the bank overdraft).

3.16 Whilst the CFR decreased during 2018/19 it is expected that this will increase in the medium term due to the demands of the capital programme and the lack of ongoing resources available to meet this expenditure. The related borrowing requirement as determined by the Liability Benchmark, also takes into account usable reserves and working capital, and is set out in more detail within the 2019/20 Treasury Management Strategy.

**4.0** **Compliance with Treasury Management Strategy**

4.1 The Treasurer of the OPFCC is pleased to report that with the exception of some minor issues (see paragraphs 4.4 and 5.2) all treasury management activities undertaken during 2018/19 complied fully with the CIPFA Code of Practice and the OPFCC’s approved Treasury Management Strategy.

4.2 Compliance with the authorised limit and operational boundary for external debt is demonstrated in table 5 on the following page.

Table 5: Debt Limits

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2018/19 Maximum** | **31.3.19 Actual** | **2018/19 Operational Boundary** | **2018/19 Authorised Limit** | **Complied?**  Yes/No |
| Borrowing | £9m | £0m | £20m | £20m | Yes |

4.3 It should be noted that since the operational boundary is a management tool for in-year monitoring it is not significant if the operational boundary is breached on occasions due to variations in cash flow, and this is not counted as a compliance failure. For 2018/19 however there were no instances when total debt was above the operational boundary.

4.4 Compliance with the approved investment counterparties list is demonstrated in table 6 below.

Table 6: Investment Counterparties

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2018/19 Maximum** | **31.3.19 Actual** | **2018/19 Guideline Limit** | **Complied?** |
| Lloyds bank account | £4.5m | £0.7m | £5.0m | Yes |
| Other UK financial institutions – Barclays call account / notice account | £2.0m / 8% | £1.5m / 7% | Higher of 5% or £1.0m | Yes\* |
| Other UK financial institutions – Santander call account | £2.0m / 6% | £1.1m / 6% | Higher of 5% or £1.0m | Yes\* |
| Other UK financial institutions – Nationwide BS | £2.0m / 8% | £0.0m / 0% | Higher of 5% or £1.0m | Yes\*\* |
| Other UK financial institutions – Coventry BS | £2.0m / 8% | £0.0m / 0% | Higher of 5% or £1.0m | Yes\*\* |
| Other UK financial institutions – Goldman Sachs | £2.0m / 8% | £0.0m / 0% | Higher of 5% or £1.0m | Yes\* |
| UK central government (including DMO & Treasury Bills) | £46.5m | £3.5m | Unlimited | Yes |
| UK local authorities – Rotherham Council | £5m | £5m | £5m | Yes |
| Money market funds - Aberdeen | £5m | £5m | £5m | Yes |
| Money market funds - Blackrock | £3m | £0m | £5m | Yes |
| Money market funds - Insight | £5m | £3m | £5m | Yes |

\*Limits with call accounts (e.g. Barclays and Santander) are calculated at the point that monies are invested or withdrawn. Whilst there were some instances when the balances of both of these counterparties subsequently exceeded the recommended counterparty limit of 5% (e.g. not within the guidelines of the 18/19 strategy) it was nevertheless viewed as low-risk as the monies were accessible on a same-day basis. Furthermore, the balances held with both of these counterparties were subsequently reduced during April 2019.

\*\* Limits for counterparties with fixed term deposits are calculated only at the point that monies are invested e.g. by their nature the OPFCC cannot call back these investments during the term specified and therefore the OPFCC cannot legislate against the counterparty’s % increasing during this period.

**5.0 Treasury Management Indicators**

5.1 The OPFCC measured and managed its exposure to treasury management risks during 2018/19 using the following indicators.

5.2 **Interest rate exposure:** The OPFCC has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to interest rate risk for both borrowing and investments. The upper limits on fixed and variable rate interest rate exposure, expressed as the % of either net principal borrowed or net investments, are shown in table 7 below.

Table 7: Interest rate exposure

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2018/19 Maximum borrowing** | **2018/19 Maximum limit** | **2018/19**  **Maximum investments** | **2018/19**  **Maximum**  **limit** | **Complied?** |
| Upper limit on fixed interest rate exposure | 100% | 100% | 82% | 100% | Yes |
| Upper limit on variable interest rate exposure | 0% | 25% | 100% | 50% | No |

5.3 The interest rate exposure indicator used for investments in the 2018/19 strategy did not take into account the low cash balances typically held during May-June. During this time the OPFCC only had call account investments, all at variable rate debt. This indicator has been reset to a more realistic figure for the 2019/20 Treasury Management Strategy.

5.4 **Security:** The OPFCC has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the average credit rating criteria for each of the counterparties it invests money with. These credit ratings are provided by the three main credit agencies in the UK (Standard & Poors, Fitch and Moody’s) and are used in addition to counterparty information received from the OPFCC’s treasury management advisors Arlingclose.

Table 8: Average credit ratings for counterparties

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2018/19 actual** | **2018/19 target** | **Complied?** |
| Portfolio average credit rating | A | A | Yes |

5.5 **Liquidity:** The OPFCC has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount of cash available to meet unexpected payments on a daily basis, without the need for additional borrowing.

Table 9: OPFCC bank overdraft facility

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2018/19 actual** | **2018/19 target** | **Complied?** |
| OPFCC bank account overdraft facility available (minimum) | £1.5m | £1m | Yes |

5.6 As per the comments in paragraph 3.15 the OPFCC used additional overdraft facilities twice during the year to manage cash deficits, as an alternative to short-term external borrowing. Table 9 shows that the maximum overdraft facility used was £1.5m.

5.7 **Principal sums invested beyond 365 days:** The purpose of this indicator is to control the OPFCC’s exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments. The limits on the long-term principal sum invested to final maturities beyond the period end are shown in table 10 below:

Table 10: No funds will be invested beyond 365 days

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2017/18  £m** | **2018/19**  **£m** | **Complied?** |
| Actual principal invested beyond year-end | 0 | 0 | Yes |
| Limit on principal invested beyond year-end | 0 | 0 | Yes |

**Appendix A**

**Investment position at 31st March 2018 and 31st March 2019**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **31/3/18**  **£000** | **Start date** | **Maturity date** | **Rate**  **%** |
| **Call/notice accounts** |  |  |  |  |
| Santander UK PLC | 1,000 |  |  | 0.25% |
| Barclays Bank PLC | 1,000 |  |  | 0.30%\* |
| **Total** | **2,000** |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Fixed term deposits** |  |  |  |  |
| Bank of England - DMO | 8,000 | 29/03/18 | 03/04/18 | 0.25% |
| **Total** | **8,000** |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Other** |  |  |  |  |
| Lloyds current account | 805 |  |  | 0.15% |
| Other cash balances | 3,325 |  |  | n/a |
| **Total** | **4,130** |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Total all investments** | **14,130** |  |  |  |

**\*** No annual bonus receivable on this account from June 2017 onwards

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **31/3/19**  **£000** | **Start date** | **Maturity date** | **Rate\***  **%** |
| **Call/notice accounts** |  |  |  |  |
| Santander UK PLC | 1,120 |  |  | 0.85% |
| Barclays Bank PLC | 1,500 |  |  | 0.75% |
| **Total** | **2,620** |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Money market funds** |  |  |  |  |
| Aberdeen | 5,000 |  |  | 0.79% |
| Insight | 3,000 |  |  | 0.75% |
|  | **8,000** |  |  |  |
| **Fixed term deposits** |  |  |  |  |
| Bank of England - DMO | 3,500 | 29/03/19 | 01/04/19 | 0.50% |
| Rotherham Council | 5,000 | 24/10/18 | 23/04/19 | 0.90% |
| **Total** | **8,500** |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Other** |  |  |  |  |
| Lloyds current account | 711 |  |  | 0.40% |
| Other cash balances | (1,291) |  |  | n/a |
| **Total** | **(580)** |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Total all investments** | **18,540** |  |  |  |

\* For call accounts/money market funds this is the rate as at 31/3/19 (this may fluctuate during the year)

**Appendix B**

**Total investments during 2018/19 listed by counterparty**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Total invested**  **£000** | **Number of deals** | **Average daily balance**  **£000** | **Highest rate achieved** | **Lowest rate achieved** |
| Aberdeen MMF | n/a – MMF | n/a – MMF | 4,412 | 0.79% | 0.52% |
| Bank of England – DMO | 292,000 | 82 | 6,160 | 0.51% | 0.25% |
| Bank of England -Treasury Bills | 47,944 | 12 | 8,886 | 0.70% | 0.36% |
| Barclays | n/a – call | n/a – call | 1,322 | 0.75% | 0.30% |
| Blackrock | n/a – MMF | n/a - MMF | 440 | 0.68% | 0.42% |
| Coventry BS | 4,000 | 2 | 1,342 | 0.68% | 0.68% |
| Goldman Sachs | 4,000 | 2 | 1,019 | 0.72% | 0.70% |
| Insight MMF | n/a – MMF | n/a – MMF | 3,519 | 0.78% | 0.50% |
| Nationwide BS | 3,500 | 2 | 1,052 | 0.69% | 0.62% |
| Rotherham LA | 5,000 | 1 | 2,718 | 0.90% | n/a |
| Santander | n/a - call | n/a – call | 1,159 | 0.85% | 0.25% |

LA = Local Authority

BS = Building Society  
MMF = Money Market Fund  
Call = Call or Notice account